The Great Financial Crisis, Commodity Prices and Environmental Limits by Lopez, Ramon E.
  1







































Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The University of Maryland, College Park 
 
 
   2










 The Great Financial Crisis, Commodity Prices and 
Environmental Limits  
                                                                    
                                                                   By 
 
                                            
 
                                           Ramón López 



















Excellent research assistance was provided by Asif Islam, a graduate student at the 















This paper examines how certain new structural factors have contributed to the latest 
great financial crisis and world recession of 2008-09. We focus on three of these 
structural factors: (i) the incorporation of highly populated countries into the growth 
process; (ii) The increasing scarcity of the environment and certain natural resources; (iii) 
the unprecedented concentration of wealth and income in the advanced economies over 
the last three decades. These structural changes have significantly tightened the links 
between world growth and commodity prices, have made the world commodity supply to 
become increasingly inelastic, and have made growth to become more dependent on lax 
monetary policies, respectively. All this may make the recovery from the current crisis 
much more difficult, implying a deeper and more protracted crisis than most previous 
crises. With this framework in mind we focus on the likely affect of the financial crisis 
upon the natural resources in the developing world, by drawing implications from the 
1995 Mexico-originated Peso crisis and the 1998-99 Asia crises. We find that the impact 
of the current crisis is likely to degrade further the environmental resources and the 
tightening of environmental policies in response to such degradation may make the 







This paper examines how certain new structural factors have affected the emergence and 
nature of the latest great financial crisis and world recession of 2008-09. We focus on 
three of these structural factors: (i) the growing importance of highly populated countries, 
most prominently China and India awakening from centuries of economic lethargy, as 
engines of world growth and massive providers of industrial goods; (ii) The increasing 
scarcity of the environment and certain natural resources which for the first time in 
history is beginning to be reckoned with in rich and even some poor countries; (iii) the 
unprecedented concentration of wealth and income in the advanced economies that has 
taken place over the last three decades. These structural changes have significantly 
tightened the links between world growth and commodity prices due to the fact that 
growth has become more commodity-intensive and that the world commodity supply 
curve is finally becoming increasingly less elastic.  In addition, they have caused an   4
increasing dependence of economic growth on lax monetary policies as an instrument to 
allow consumers easy access to credit at low interest rates.  These two features, closer 
growth-commodity price linkages and higher dependence of growth on lax monetary 
policies, are likely to make fast economic growth with price stability much harder to 
achieve in the future. In addition, we show that they will make the economic recovery 
from the current crisis much more difficult, which may imply a crisis that is deeper and 
more protracted than most previous crises with the exception perhaps of the 1930s 
depression.   
 
With this framework in mind we analyze various conditions which are likely to affect the 
impact of the financial crisis on the developing world particularly focusing on the impact 
upon the natural resources. Given the great heterogeneity of developing countries in 
many respects, the impacts of the crisis are likely to vary dramatically across countries 
and across different types of environmental resources.  Naturally it is impossible to 
capture even a small fraction of the variety of potential effects of the crisis on developing 
countries.  We thus choose to provide a taxonomical approach based on a number of key 
distinguishing conditions in terms of policies, natural resources and other country 
characteristics, which allow us to provide in principle testable hypotheses about the 
direction and potential gravity of the environmental impacts of the crisis under a limited 
number of possible situations.  Given that it is of course too early to have empirical 
evidence about the impact of the current crisis, we instead examine certain effects of two 
previous crises episodes, the 1995 Mexico-originated Peso crisis and the 1998-99 Asia 
crisis, which have been evaluated in the literature.  
 
Part II below provides an in depth analysis of the emergence of the great recession within 
the context of the new economic order that the three structural factors listed in the first 
paragraph above have given rise to.  This analysis encompasses a retrospective historical 
analysis of the articulation of the rich country-poor country world emphasizing how the 
role of the traditionally poor countries has evolved making economic growth increasingly 
less exclusive over time. Next we briefly examine the consequences of radical new 
policies in the advanced economies forcefully implemented by a series of conservative 
governments supported by a reinvented intellectual lazes-faire market ideology. This part 
concludes by showing how the nature and depth of the current crisis has been conditioned   5
by these developments.  In Part III we provide the taxonomic analysis regarding the 
possible impact of the crisis on the environmental resources in the developing countries. 
We focus mainly on the potential impacts of the crisis on pollution, deforestation and on 
the extraction of natural resources especially of those situated in fragile environments. 
Part IV concludes.                        
 
  




For much of the 20
th Century persistent economic growth was the privilege of an 
exclusive club comprising no more than a fifth of the world population (which we 
henceforth call the “North”).  As the North grew richer it experienced continuous 
structural change leading to an increasing “dematerialization” of its production. The 
structure of GDP in the North became increasingly more focused on services and, in 
general, on activities that are human capital and high tech dependent while the resource-
based and later most manufacturing sectors gradually shrank as a share of total output. 
Figure 1 shows the intensity of this process over the last half century in the USA as 
reflected by the persistent decline of the shares of both commodity outputs as well as of 
manufacturing output in total GDP.  Production of manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, 
fishing  and mining have dramatically reduced their combined participation in GDP from 
more than 40% in the early fifties to less than 20% in the early 2000s.   
 
This dematerialization of production was not fully matched by a similar dematerialization 
of consumption in the North. While some shifting in the structure of consumer demand 
away from certain commodities such as food products into services did take place 
consumers in the North continued to expand their demands for industrial goods, 
especially durables, at a pace that often exceeded growth of per capita GDP. Moreover, 
the decline of the consumption share of commodities was much less than the reduction of 
the share of commodities in domestic production.  This divergence between structural 
changes in domestic production and consumption meant that the North became 
increasingly more reliant in the rest of the world (the “South”) as a supplier first of 
primary commodities and, especially over the last three decades, of manufacturing goods 
as well.      6
 
In fact, an examination of the evolution of trade flows clearly shows a rapid increase of 
net imports of primary products as well as of industrial goods over time which implies 
that the shifts in consumption towards services and away from material goods were 
probably weaker than the structural change that took place in production towards 
dematerialization of output. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this for the USA. Figure 2 shows 
the significant rise in the participation of imports of industrial goods in total US imports.  
Figure 3 shows the large increases in the imports of manufacturing and industrial goods 
as a proportion of domestic industry value added.  This is also true for most other 
commodities including metals (Figure 4). As can be seen in these figures the rise of the 
imports of industrial and commodity goods has been particularly steep over the last 2 
decades.   
 
While at times the South was able to exhibit some modest growth, up until the last three 
or four decades most of the South could not sustain such growth for prolonged periods of 
time and thus became a passive supplier of primary commodities to the North. As the 
North increased its net demand for commodities the South was an effective supplier of 
them. The fact that the South had what until a few decades ago seemed almost boundless 
natural resources and imposed practically no effective environmental regulations limiting 
the heavy environmental damages entailed by their exploitation, combined with a slow 
expansion of its own domestic demand for commodities as a consequence of its relative 
stagnation, allowed the North to face stable and low commodity prices (Figure 5).   
 
From colonial times the North had established efficient commodity-producing enclaves in 
the South keeping the markets in the North as their almost exclusive goal. The increasing 
demand for commodities from the North was matched by the continuous exploration and 
expansion of the enclave economy thus developed in the South. In a context of resource 
abundance in the South and no effective regulations limiting resource extraction 
environmental damages, the long run supply curve of commodities was for a long time 
essentially flat (López and Stocking, 2009). This meant that the North could grow with 
the luxury of constant and even at times declining commodity prices for many decades. 
As has been well documented by several studies, these enclaves spillover very little into 
the rest of the economies in the South, which meant that they played little role in   7
promoting economic growth in the South (Prebisch, 1959; de Janvry, 1975; Weiskoff and 
Wolff, 1977).  The South remained essentially stagnated thus exerting little pressure on 
commodity demand which, in turn, facilitated the stability of their prices. This process 
continued well into the second half of the twentieth Century (Sokoloff and Engerman, 
2000; Acemoglu et. al. 2001;  Khor, 2000).  
 
The emerging South 
 
Things started to change in the 1970s with the emergence of a few countries mainly in 
South East Asia which were able to rapidly grow for prolonged periods of time relying on 
an export-oriented strategy. The emergence of these little giants of manufacturing exports 
allowed the North to deepen its relative specialization in clean non-material outputs 
increasingly relying on the old South and new emerging industrializing countries (NIC) 
as efficient suppliers of primary commodities and of industrial goods, respectively. While 
the NIC were able to grow very rapidly through a phenomenal increase of manufacturing 
exports to the North their population was relatively small to have an impact on the world 
demand for primary commodities, including energy, metals and food commodities.  This 
meant that the expansion of the NIC did not signify greater demand pressures on 
commodity prices, which as can be appreciated in Figure 5, remained essentially stable. 
Thus, by the late eighties the world had achieved a remarkable equilibrium: The North 
plus a few NIC were able to grow fast, the North on the basis of clean service oriented 
production which greatly facilitated its environmentally “sustainable” development at 
low cost, the NIC supplying the North an increasing portion of its growing industrial 
demands at low market prices albeit at great domestic environmental costs, and the still 
languishing old South supplying raw materials also at  low prices but at the cost of a 
continuous erosion of its natural resources and environment
1.   
 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, the North started a dramatic reversal of its environmental degradation by the mid 1970s, 
which coincided with the emergence of the NIC as suppliers of dirty industrial goods at low costs. This 
process also coincides with the time when most of the modern environmental regulation in the North begun 
to be implemented. Perhaps increasingly stringent environmental regulation in the North was made 
politically acceptable precisely because of the rise of foreign dirty industrial good suppliers.  López (2008) 
provides some evidence showing that one of the reasons why the North is able to enforce significant 
environmental regulation at a very low cost (estimated at less than 2% of GDP) is the emergence of the 
NIC and later of other big industrial suppliers which allowed the North to rapidly shift its production away 
from dirty industrial goods. This view is consistent with the econometric evidence provided by Levinson 
and Taylor (2008).              8
The nineties brought more dramatic change. The emergence of the new industrial giants 
(NIG) mainly China, India and a few other large initially poor countries able to grow at 
remarkably fast rates was in part a consequence of dramatic policy reforms in these 
countries. These new policies included pro-market reforms, export promotion through 
exchange rate policies and other incentives, strengthening of property rights, and weak 
environmental regulations which effectively meant the ability to grow with little 
environmental constraints. In addition, the success of these new policies was assured by 
the rapidly growing consumer demands of the North for industrial goods.  
 
The NIG were as effective suppliers of industrial goods as the NIC but at a much greater 
scale. Industrial export-led growth allowed them to experience similar unprecedented 
economic growth for over two decades as the NIC. Both the NIC and NIG based their 
development on the rapid expansion of industrial exports which was made possible by 
undervalued exchange rates
2. This, in turn, meant enormous accumulation of foreign 
exchange which was recycled into the North (Figure 6). The large financial resources 
flowing into the North made possible low interest rates and a great availability of easy 
credit. In addition, the inflow of capital from both the NIG and oil exporters into the 
North contributed to a continuous appreciation of equities and real estate which 
prolonged the economic boom and financial bubble. This, in turn, fed a massive appetite 
in the North for more industrial imports from the emerging and prosperous NIG.   
 
Again, a remarkable and seemingly self-sustained equilibrium was created: The NIG‘s 
massive financial assets created by its industrial export success fed the North boom 
which, in turn, feedback the continuous expansion of the NIG. In fact, the real annual 
GDP growth rates of China and India over the last three decades has been consistently 
above 8%, more than three times faster than the growth rate in the advanced economies 
(Table 1).  More importantly, the NIG (China, India, Russia and Brazil) are estimated to 
have contributed more than US$ 350 billion to the annual growth of the world in the early 
2000s. That is, more than a third of the total annual growth of the world estimated at 
                                                 
2According to Rodrik (2007), both China and India have not only had undervalued exchange rates over the 
last two decades but the degree of undervaluation has consistently increased over the period. Most of the 
NIC also based their industrial export take off on undervalued exchange rates although, unlike the NIG, in 
more recent periods some of them have allowed their real exchange rate to become less undervalued and 
even at times overvalued.          9
about $1.1 trillion. As can be seen in Table 2, the participation of China and India, at 
about $200 billion, constituted almost 20% of the total annual growth in the world in the 
2000-07 period compared to only about 5% in the 1980s.   
  
The new North-NIG boom equilibrium of the second half of the 1990s and 2000s had one 
important difference with the early North-NIC equilibrium of the seventies, eighties and 
first half of the nineties:  the NIG constitute almost 50% of humanity compared to at most 
5% of the NIC. That is, the emergence of the NIG brought about a dramatic expansion of 
the growth club and, hitherto inedited in history, the South itself became an important and 
rapidly growing consumer of primary commodities.  Persistent economic growth ceased 
to be an exclusive attribute to a small portion of human kind to now, for the first time in 
history, become almost universal.  
 
The startling and persistent growth of the NIG brought about not only a drastic increase 
in the supply of industrial goods but also a dramatic increase in the NIG demands for 
energy, food, and other raw materials. At first, since the NIG started from very low levels 
of consumption of such goods, their increased demand for these commodities had little 
consequence for world commodity markets. However, after a decade or so of 8-10% 
growth rate the enormous population size of the NIG caused their demand for 
commodities to reach a sizable portion of the total world demand as it is today (just China 
consumes more oil than the total production of Saudi Arabia, the biggest oil producer, 
and almost as much as the USA).  Figures 10-12 and Table 3 illustrate the rapid increase 
in the level of consumption and share in total world consumption of energy as well as 
certain other commodities over the last two decades of China and India.  
 
By the early 2000s the share of the world commodity demand of the NIG became 
sufficiently large as a proportion of total world consumption to start having a significant 
effect on their market prices. This meant that fast NIG growth led to a run up on 
commodities with consequent drastic price increases. Continued rapid economic growth 
in both the NIG and the North precipitated the drastic increases in oil and other 
commodity prices that begun in 2002.   
 
   10
The new policies of the North 
 
By the early eighties the North started its own “structural change”.   The view that the 
economy was being suffocated by excessive government intervention and too high taxes 
became quite accepted among policy makers and economists.  It was thought that by 
acting on theses issues it could be possible to increase economic efficiency and thus 
allow economic growth to speed up. Most countries in the North embarked in a far 
reaching policy experiment that was intended to significantly increase market incentives 
to investment and innovation.    
 
The new structural change policies included various pro-market policies in conjunction 
with a pervasive process of extricating the government out of the economy. It included 
large cuts in taxes and in a broad spectrum of social spending as well as a vast financial 
deregulation.  Even more important than the financial deregulation itself was the “de-
supervision” that has occurred over the last two decades as a consequence of deliberate 
government actions to weaken the powers of the regulatory agencies by cutting their 
budgets, personnel, and attributions (Caprio et. al., 2008).  In addition, structural change 
especially in the USA also included subtle policies and legislation directed to weakening 
labor unions.   While some of these policies may have accelerated investments, especially 
financial ones, they also appear to have had some serious unintended consequences on 
income distribution.    
 
The very policies that were intended to increase economic efficiency and continued 
economic growth in the North -most prominently, financial deregulation and de-
supervision, major tax cuts for the wealthy, and concomitant public spending reduction, 
specially social spending, and the weakening of labor unions-  were in part responsible 
for the massive concentration of income observed over the last three decades
3.  Figures 7 
                                                 
3 There is a vast literature that tries to explain the concentration of income mainly focusing on the 
distribution of wages among broad groups within the labor force (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006; Autor 
Levy and Murnane, 2003; Card and di Nardo, 2002).  Most of them emphasize issues related to the 
implications of new technologies and increased levels of human capital for wage distribution. A study by 
Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007) has looked at consequences of decreased unionization of the labor force-a 
process that has accelerated precisely since the time of structural change- for wage polarization. Few 
studies have looked at the upper end of the wage distribution which appears to explain a high portion of 
wage concentration. Kaplan and Rauh (2009) does this showing that the amazing increases in executive 
compensation to investment bankers, hedge fund, private equity and mutual fund managers and traders as   11
and 8 give an idea of the large concentration of income that has taken place in the USA 
and UK, respectively, especially since the early eighties.   In the US the middle class 
(which we define as the second, third and fourth quintiles of the household income 
distribution) continuously reduced its participation in national income from almost 54% 
in 1980 to 47% in 2006 while the poor (the bottom 20%) reduced its participation from 
5% to 4%.  Most of these reductions benefited the rich, the top 5% of the households, 
which increased their participation in national household income from 17% to 22.5% 
over the same period. Similarly, over the period 1980-2006 the share of the middle class 
in the UK fell from 55% to 50% and that of the poorest quintile also decreased from 10% 
to 8% over the period. Concomitantly, the share of the top 10% of the households 
increased from 20% to 27% of the total household income.  
 
These figures reflect massive transfers of wealth from the middle class to the wealthy, 
which meant that the per capita income of the middle classes increased at a much slower 
pace than the national per capita income.  This concentration of income meant that the 
mean real household income of the middle class in the USA barely increased over the last 
three decades, from $48,000 in the early eighties to $52,000 in 2007 (Figure 9).  That is, 
while the annual per capita GDP in this period grew by more than 2% the annual 
household income growth of the middle class was about 0.3%.  By contrast, the mean real 
household income of the top 5% of the population rose dramatically, from $155,000 to 
$290,000 over the same period at a much faster rate than per capita GDP.    
   
Dilemmas and paradoxes 
 
The continuous process of income concentration represented a significant problem 
because for a long time the persistence of a high rate of economic growth has become 
highly dependent on equally rapid rates consumption growth. Consumption is in fact the 
key engine of growth and the backbone of mass consumption is the middle class.  
Economic growth needs a continuous and rapid expansion of consumption which only a 
                                                                                                                                                 
well as other types of top executives in large corporations explain to a large extent the observed 
polarization of wage income.  We postulate that the incredible rise of executive compensation benefiting 
perhaps no more than 1% of the labor force is due mainly to extreme financial deregulation and other 
structural adjustment policies initiated in the early eighties.                12
prosperous middle class can support
4. But the middle class was increasing its income at a 
rate that was less than one eighth of the per capita GDP growth rate. So in principle the 
rate of growth of household income of the middle class was hardly sufficient to support 
the pace of growth in the economy’s consumption that was needed to sustain economic 
growth in the North at its historical rates.  Thus, the dilemma was how to persuade the 
middle class to expand its consumption at a sufficient rapid pace to sustain annual per 
capita GDP growth rates of the order of 2-2.5% despite that its real income was 
increasing at only 0.3%.  
 
The required expansion of consumption could only occur if credit was plentiful and 
cheap and if the middle class was enticed to accept ever increasing levels of debt. This is 
where the growing flow of financial resources from the NIG and oil-exporter countries 
into the North and domestic “financial innovation” made possible by deregulation come 
into place.  Cheap and plentiful credit was offered to almost anyone. Why did households 
bite so easily and so massively into the easy credit temptation?  The massive inflow of 
capital from the NIG and oil-exporting countries  in a context of almost complete 
effective financial deregulation created the last component of the miracle (or better 
mirage), the dramatic appreciation of all sort of assets mainly equities and real estate. 
Capital gains made the ordinary citizens feel richer despite that their income flow 
increased little as most of the income growth accrued to a very small minority of the 
population. Confounding necessarily short term capital gains with permanent income 
induced the middle class to cut savings-rapidly increasing consumption- and happily 
accept the easy credit that was offered to them.   
 
While the dilemma of sustaining economic growth in the midst of a stagnated middle 
class was “solved” via easy credit and low interest rates it nonetheless embodies ominous 
implications.  The model of growth requires ever increasing household debt in turn 
supported by ever increasing equity and real estate appreciation. Obviously not 
something that can be considered a permanent solution. Perhaps even worse, the high 
dependence of the middle class on debt and new borrowing made the consequences of 
                                                 
4 Another possible engine of growth was exports, but given the historically low weight of export value 
added in GDP, even rapid export expansion cannot give enough support to domestic growth.  Investment, 
with less than 20% of GDP is also too small to make a significant difference for growth; also, investments 
are to a great extent driven by the consumer demand itself.      13
restricting the monetary policy potentially much more costly than in previous times when 
the economy’s consumption and hence growth was not nearly as dependent on middle 
class borrowing as it is today.  The phenomenal debt-income ratios reached over the last 
decade made consumers’ income greatly sensitive to interest rate hikes that increase debt 
service.  We return to these important issues below.                          
 
Commodity prices and the crisis  
 
Given the relatively low share of commodities in the consumer demand in the North at 
first the significant commodity price increases had little impact on inflation in the North.    
However, given the magnitude of the commodity demand increases that 8-10% annual 
growth rates in the NIG required, commodity prices continued increasing very rapidly.    
As commodity prices skyrocket in 2003-2004 they began to have an effect first in the 
overall consumer price index in the USA and many other countries which were not 
necessarily immediately internalized by the monetary authorities as long as they did not 
affect the so-called “core” inflation.  However, core inflation was eventually affected 
(more than doubled in 2004) and by the third quarter of 2004 the Fed started a process of 
monetary restriction causing a steady rise of the effective federal fund rate from 1.25% in 
such quarter to more than 5% by the end of 2007. Figure 13 shows the connection 
between monetary policy and commodity prices in the USA: by the end of 2004 the oil 
price increases had spilled over into most other commodities and thus started to have an 
effect on the core CPI inflation. In fact, the core CPI more than doubled in a short period 
of time. It appears that this prompted the Fed to start a protracted period of monetary 
tightening as reflected by the large increases of the Fed Fund Rate during 2004-2007.  
 
Given the increased dependence of growth on an ever expanding household debt and easy 
borrowing that the income squeeze of the middle class required to sustain growth, the 
tightening of monetary policy in the 2004-07 period was to have much more serious 
consequences than previous episodes of monetary restrictions
5. In fact, it triggered the 
end of the economic boom and the beginning of the great recession.  First the higher 
interest rates caused a concomitant increase in mortgage rates leading to the sudden 
                                                 
5 The financial and real estate bubble that was highly dependent on cheap credit was part of this same 
phenomenon.     14
collapse of the housing market. The fall of real estate value with the consequent 
evaporation of a significant part of earlier capital gains caused consumers to suddenly 
realize that they were not nearly as wealthy as they had been led to believe.  
 
In addition, the drying up of credit made it increasingly difficult for the middle class to 
continue borrowing and, more important, the cost to consumers of servicing their 
accumulated debt went up significantly.  The large debt-to-income ratio of consumers has 
made their income perhaps like never before greatly vulnerable to interest rate increases.     
All this prompted a first round of adjustment in household consumption. At the same 
time it caused widespread defaults in the housing sector which, in turn, led to the 
financial collapse inducing enormous capital losses to equity markets. The large capital 
losses in the equity markets, in turn, caused a second round impact on consumption (due 
to a wealth effect) which ultimately allowed the crisis to impact the real sector causing 
higher unemployment and great instability in the labor market. This appears to be 
inducing a third round effect on the income and consumption of the middle class, which 
we are experiencing today. In addition, the subsequent collapse of the world economy led 
to a significant fall in world commodity demands and their prices.  
 
Policy Responses to the crisis 
 
The responses of governments to the crisis have been directed to:  (i) a widespread  
bailing out process which entailed massive transfers of state resources to the large 
financial and later to non-financial corporations; (ii) a drastic relaxation of the monetary 
policy bringing short term interest rates to near zero levels and quantitative monetary 
intervention meaning that the central banks have effectively become direct lenders, 
especially to large financial institutions, at an unprecedented scale; (iii) Massive fiscal 
expansion which have created deficits rarely seen in the history of the advanced 
economies.   
 
The deficit-financed new fiscal spending is expected to replace in part the large reduction 
of private expenditures and in the process stimulate a recovery in economic activity that 
may entice consumers once again to reignite their pace of consumption expenditures. The 
increased private consumption would be stimulated by the economic recovery that the   15
fiscal expansion would cause and by the near zero interest rates that the monetary policy 
would allow for.  However, the fiscal deficits effectively imply huge new financial 
liabilities to ordinary citizens that sooner or later will have to be paid for either via higher 
taxes and/or inflation. That is, to the capital losses to consumers that the real estate and 
equity markets collapse caused, now one has to add the new potential capital liabilities 
generated by the fiscal deficits.  In addition, the generous government aid to the financial 
firms and to other parts of the large corporate sector effectively means, once again, a 
massive transfer of resources from the average citizen to the wealthiest segments of 
society. This may thus worsen even further the wealth concentration which as we have 
seen is one of the fundamental factors behind the severity of the economic consequences 
that the tightening of the monetary policy induces.                        
 
Thus, while output growth in the North has become directly less dependent on 
commodities, paradoxically its income growth has indirectly become more dependent on 
commodities. This is so because world growth is now more intensive in commodities as a 
consequence of the incorporation of low income-highly populated countries into the 
growth process. Continued world economic growth is now more tightly linked to 
increased commodity price.  While inflation in the advanced economies has become less 
influenced by commodity inflation, the persistent commodity price increases caused by 
rapid world growth eventually makes its way into the core inflation. This, in turn, leads to 
restricted monetary policies which as a consequence of the highly concentrated income 
distribution have now much more dramatic effects in the real sector of the economy than 
has historically been the case. The consequence: World economic growth may become 
much more difficult to sustain than in the past. 
 
Environmental scarcity and more paradoxes 
 
The increased connection between commodity demand and economic growth that the 
incorporation of the NIG into the growth mode brought about has happened at the time 
when natural resources in the rest of the South are becoming less abundant and when the 
dire environmental consequences of the frenetic expansion of natural resource extraction 
are finally beginning to be taken seriously in the South.  Even if the underground 
availability of most but not all raw materials may still be plentiful there are clear signs   16
that their supply must rely in increasingly more expensive sources; moreover, resource 
extraction has led to massive environmental costs affecting ever more crucial ecosystems, 
water quality, forests and many other increasingly scarce environments
6. Under 
increasing pressures from international NGOs and part of the domestic civil society 
developing country governments are finally beginning to take into consideration some of 
these large environmental costs that commodity extraction entails.  More countries are 
now enforcing at least some modest environmental regulation affecting the use of many 
ecosystems which tend to be destroyed by callous resource extraction. These restrictions 
ultimately make the extraction of commodities more costly even in cases where the 
ground resources are plenty.  
 
This means that now, perhaps for the first time in history, the long run supply curve of 
resource commodities has become relatively inelastic.  The inherent fixity of the earth is 
finally translating into a more and more vertical supply of commodities. This 
phenomenon, in conjunction with the great expansion of the world’s growth club into 
massively populated countries, explains the unusual response of commodity prices to fast 
world growth observed over the 2000s. The emergence of the NIG has meant that world 
economic growth has become more dependent on commodities at a time when 
commodity supply has become less elastic. Hence, like never before it appears that world 
economic growth and commodity prices are now intimately related.    
 
Doubtless, the increasing scarcity of natural resources could be in part off-set with the 
development of appropriate resource-saving new technologies. New technologies could 
reduce such intimate connection between world economic growth and commodity prices. 
Paradoxically, sustained high and for a period increasing energy and other commodity 
prices are needed as a key incentive for technical change to be oriented towards the 
generation of such technologies. The low and stable commodity prices prevailing over 
most of the 20
th Century directed R&D to produce new technologies that were generally 
capital and energy intensive to save mainly labor. These new technologies were mostly 
                                                 
6 With some important exceptions, the real limits to the supply of primary commodities are not so much the 
scarcity of in-ground raw materials, but rather the large and increasing environmental costs that their 
production entails (Simpson, Toman, and Ayres, 2005).  Resource extraction greatly affects water quality 
(mining, oil extraction), soils and forests (e.g., mountain top removal for coal extraction). The US could, 
for example, dramatically increase its oil production at the cost of unacceptable further environmental 
destruction by expanding off-shore or Alaskan production.    17
intensive users of the cheapest factors of production, the environment and the natural 
resources.  While some internalization of the true cost of the environment were 
implemented in the North, environmental compliance costs are in fact extremely low 
even in the wealthiest countries and the low historical prices of commodities imply  
reduced incentives to produce technologies that saved commodities.         
 
The connection between commodity prices and the direction of technological change 
implies a classical coordination problem: Reducing the dependence of economic growth 
on natural resources and commodities needs high and for a while increasing commodity 
prices as a signal to the private sector to invest more on the generation of resource and 
environmentally-saving new technologies. However, increasing commodity prices make 
the world economies more inflation vulnerable, as occurred in the years prior to the 
current crisis,   which prompts central banks around the developed world to tighten 
monetary policies and raise interest rates as soon as commodity prices threaten their low 
inflation targets. But given the unprecedented concentration of wealth that policies in the 
North have caused, consumption –the engine of economic growth- has become extremely 
vulnerable to interest rates as a consequence of the protracted dependence of consumers 
on credit, in turn caused by the gradual plundering of the middle class. Allowing 
increasing commodity prices to the extent needed to reduce the long run dependence of 
world growth on commodities through the development of new resource-saving 
technologies would trigger inflation in the context of an accommodative monetary policy. 
But this is unacceptable for the North, so monetary policy is used to counter the threat of 
inflation. This in principle would not affect the relative price of commodities while 
arresting inflationary pressures. However, because of the extreme dependence of growth 
on easy credit the tightening of money rapidly affect consumption which, in turn, leads to 
slower or even negative growth. This, in turn, prevents commodity prices from remaining 




In addition, there is climate change: The emergence of the NIG and the stubborn 
reluctance of the USA to participate even in the modest effective efforts of other 
advanced economies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions have implied that such   18
emissions have continued at high levels.  At the same time increasing evidence indicates 
that an impending climatic disaster may be avoided only if greenhouse gases are 
drastically reduced.  The carbon emissions by the NIG constitute an increasing share of 
the total world emissions reaching more than 25% by 2006 (Figure 14); more 
importantly, the elasticity of emissions to growth in the NIG is very high which means 
that their continued economic growth will mean large increases in their emissions. Thus, 
world economic growth is now even more closely linked to carbon emissions than during 
the late 20
th century. Even stabilizing world emissions at the current unsustainable levels 
will require much greater and costly efforts by the North to compensate for the increasing 
emissions from the NIG.  Reducing the magnitude of climate change constitutes a new 
constraint on economic growth especially to the North which over the last decades has 
been in reality ignored. That is, an important yet hitherto effectively ignored limit to 
growth for the North has become even more serious with the advent of the NIG into one 
of the engines of world growth.  Sooner or later this constraint will have to be reckoned 
with.         
       
Summary 
 
The previous analysis suggests that despite that the North’s output and to some extent 
consumption has become less directly dependent on commodities, the links between 
world economic growth and commodity prices have become stronger.  This means that 
sustained growth of the NIG, by now a vital supplier of industrial goods and financial 
resources to support consumption in the North, is now inevitably associated with rapid 
increases in commodity prices.  Despite the reduction of the importance of commodities 
in the consumption bundle of the North, given the increased sensitivity of commodity 
prices to world-wide growth, commodity price increases in a growing world are large 
enough to eventually impact CPI inflation in the North.  This commodity-induced 
inflationary pressure, in turn, causes the monetary authorities in the North to tighten 
monetary policy thus reducing domestic demand and inducing financial disruptions. The 
financial implications of tighter monetary policies are now much more serious than in the 
past as a consequence of the high dependence on cheap credit that supporting aggregate 
demand in a context of a highly concentrated income distribution need.  
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Prospects 
 
It is of course extremely difficult to project the length and depth to which the on-going 
crisis can go. However, based on the above analysis we may expect that it will be very 
difficult to extricate the world from the current crisis over the next few years. It appears 
that unlike other recent economic crises, certain long term structural conditions that have 
been created over the last three decades may make considerably more difficult to return 
to normal growth conditions.  These structural factors are mainly three: (i) a great 
concentration of income and wealth that have taken place in the advanced economies and 
elsewhere; (ii) the emergence of relative scarcity of natural resources and especially of 
the environment as a sink of the byproducts of economic growth; (iii) the incorporation of 
the NIG as important actors in the world economy making economic growth highly 
demanding of commodities and natural resources.  Factor (i) implies that rekindling 
aggregate consumption as needed to restart economic growth may require the 
maintenance of easy credit and a lax monetary policy.  Factors (ii) and (iii), in turn, imply 
that fast world growth and high and increasing commodity prices have become perhaps 
for the first time in history inextricable.       
 
Currently, in response to the crisis, the world is seeing an unprecedented combination of   
massive fiscal stimulus and lax monetary policies with nominal interest rates reaching 
practically zero levels in most of the advanced economies.  Public credit has come to take 
the slack left by the reduced private credit caused by the financial debacle.  A new period 
of easy credit for all appears to have come with the only difference that the source of easy 
credit is now public instead of private credit. In addition, fiscal stimulus has meant 
gigantic fiscal deficits as governments have been generally reluctant to raise taxes on the 
rich-beyond some isolated token gestures-to finance at least in part the deficits.  It 
appears that the anti-crisis policies have done nothing to ameliorate the structural 
problems discussed above which underlie the great recession and, moreover, in certain 
respects these policies may have actually worsen such structural factors. 
 
In these conditions any incipient recovery of the world demand is likely to ignite again 
severe inflationary pressures; a phenomenon that would be aggravated if commodity 
prices were to retake its upward movement as is likely to be the case. In addition, given   20
the large fiscal imbalances any economic recovery would put large upward pressures on 
long-run interest rates.  Inflationary pressures are likely to prompt governments to reverse 
monetary policy causing further increases in interest rates and to reduce fiscal deficits by 
increasing taxes.  Moreover, the needed future tax increases almost surely will fall mainly 
into the middle class thus exacerbating the structural factor (i)
7. The effect: the incipient 
growth is likely to be suffocated at birth.   
 
Returning to sustained economic growth appears to require dealing with the underlying 
structural factors: there is a need to make aggregate demand less dependent on easy credit 
by forcefully addressing the concentration of wealth and income and there is a need to 
promote fast environmentally and commodity-saving technological change by accepting 
more restrictive environmental policies in both the North and the South so that world 
growth becomes less commodity and environmentally demanding. But these are changes 
that will require decisive policies and that would take some time to fructify. In the 
meantime, returning to rapid growth is likely to be difficult. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we thus assume that the world growth slowdown will 
remain and that the advanced economies may remain stagnated perhaps a la Japan for a 
prolonged period of time. This assumption is important because the consequences for the 
natural resources and for poverty in the developing countries critically depend on the 
length of the global slowdown. If the current crisis is merely a bump in an otherwise 
smooth road of economic growth much of its effect on the natural resources and the poor 
is likely to be small and mainly transient. If, however, the current situation represents a 
new trend the consequences are obviously much more serious and may require significant 
“structural change” in the developing economies to face this new period.  Needles to say, 
the required structural change is probably quite different from the standard structural 
change advice that the Washington consensus once was.      
 
 
II. The crisis and the developing countries 
                                                 
7 As this essay is being written the idea of a national sales tax in the USA is being increasingly regarded 
with enthusiasm by economists and policy makers. As is well known these taxes are highly regressive and 
would constitute yet another blow to the middle class. Indirect taxes are in fact an effective means to take 
the wealthiest groups out of the tax hook.       21
                
The impact of the crisis in the developing countries is likely to be dependent on certain 
key factors. These factors are likely to determine the intensity of the recession as well as 
the social and environmental impacts of the crisis.  The factors on which we focus below 
include macroeconomic policies during the boom times prior to the crisis, the stringency 
of environmental regulatory regimes, domestic policies in response to the crisis, and 
country characteristics associated with factor endowments, population density and 
poverty levels.  
       
1. Macroeconomic policies prior to the crisis 
 
Most economic crises emerge from prolonged periods of fast economic growth.  The 
present crisis is of course no exception as most developing countries enjoyed several 
years of rapid growth in part triggered by high commodity prices which caused a great 
expansion of commodity exports. In addition, some countries especially middle income 
ones greatly benefited as a consequence of the rapid expansion of manufacturing exports.  
Also, most of the South was able to attract unprecedented levels of foreign investment 
both financial and non-financial.  The export boom combined with the capital inflows 
generated plenty of foreign exchange which in many cases effectively made the 
availability of foreign exchange non-binding as a constraint to economic activity. In 
addition, the export boom contributed to rapid increases in government tax revenues 
which gave governments plenty of flexibility on the expenditure side. In most cases the 
combination of export expansion, foreign capital inflows, and rapidly increasing fiscal 





The extent to which the countries were able to speed up growth during boom times 
depended not only on the positioning of the countries to benefit out of the world 
expansion (types of exports goods, country attractiveness to foreign investors, and so 
forth) but also on certain key policies. Among them we want to emphasize one: the extent 
to which the government saved. There is of course a trade-off in the short run between   22
growth and public saving. Some countries were able to increase growth and even reduce 
poverty rapidly in the short run by spending most or all the additional revenues during the 
boom period in increasing social programs, development expenditures and in many cases 
increasing public waste. In several cases the government over shoot expenditures by 
using the boom times as an opportunity to increase borrowing
8.   
 
Other countries, knowing that the boom would eventually subside, adopted a more 
cautious approach: they saved a significant part of the increased revenues by paying off 
existing public debt, increasing foreign exchange and, in some cases, establishing 
sovereign investment funds. The accumulation of public savings during the boom times 
let these countries be better positioned to use countercyclical policies to face the 
subsequent crisis than those that did not save or even increased net public debt. Among 
countries that were able to increase public savings the most during the early 2000s boom 
times were China and India in Asia and Chile in Latin America.     
 
Countries that have saved during boom times may be able to increase social benefits and 
implement pro-employment fiscal expenditure policies during the crisis. By contrast, 
those countries that did not save may instead be forced to use pro-cyclical policies which 
often imply cutting social services and reducing other fiscal expenditures during the 
crisis. The unemployment and poverty impact is likely to be magnified in the latter 
countries and mitigated in the former ones.  This may imply very different impacts of the 
crisis for the poor and for the natural resources, especially those that are open access or 
semi-open access such as many tropical forests.   Increased unemployment and poverty 
often leads to even greater pressures on such resources by subsistence producers as these 
resources constitute the ultimate welfare refuge for the poor. In addition, governments 
that failed to save during the expansive phase need to promote the commercial 
exploitation of natural resources often at great environmental costs in desperate efforts to 
reduce the impact of the crisis.   Thus, the pressures on natural resources during the crisis 
due to unemployment and poverty is likely to be more limited among countries that saved 
in boom times than those that saved little.     
       
                                                 
8 Some of these countries instead wasted the additional revenues through increased inefficiency, corruption, 
and satisfying political clienteles.      23
Extreme opposite examples in Latin America are Chile and Venezuela.  Chile’s net 
public liquid assets increased dramatically during the boom times. Net government 
foreign assets (foreign reserves plus sovereign fund holdings minus public debt) 
dramatically increased from less than 2% of GDP in 2000 to more than 30% of GDP by 
early 2009 (Chile, Central Bank). This was made possible mainly by the extraordinary 
high prices of copper, Chile’s main export commodity. By contrast, Venezuela saved 
little of the large oil revenues that it enjoyed over several years. Despite obtaining three 
times more revenues than Chile during the 2000-06 period, by 2006 the financial position 
of the Venezuelan public sector was quite precarious with net foreign public asset 
holdings equivalent to a negligible fraction of GDP (Venezuela, Central Bank).   
 
 
2. Environmental regulatory framework and the environmental impact of the crisis 
 
 Among the developing countries there are significant disparities in the scope of the 
regulatory framework and particularly in the extent by which it is enforced.  The key 
issue is that countries with effective environmental regulation are able to impose binding 
constraints on pollution levels while in those without effective regulation such constraints 
are not binding. The pollution implications of the crisis can be opposite in the two cases: 
If there are binding pollution constraints, a likely response to the crisis is a relaxation of 
the enforcement of such constraints as a means to mitigate the employment effects of the 
crisis. Thus, in this case we have two opposite effects, the (contracting) output scale 
effect which reduces pollution and the pollution intensity effect (i.e., the level of 
pollution per unit of output or consumption) that increases it. The net effect is ambiguous 
but it may be positive despite the decline in economic activity and employment. By 
contrast, in countries without binding pollution constraints, air and water pollution is 
likely to decline with economic activity because the scale effect may not be countered by 
a pollution intensity effect. That is, in this case we only have the scale effect of the crisis 
but not the pollution intensity effect as occurs in the countries that effectively regulate but 
respond to the crisis by relaxing environmental regulation.  
 
Thus we have the following hypothesis: crises tend to worsen pollution in countries that 
have binding regulatory frameworks while they tend to improve pollution in countries   24
where the regulatory framework is weak.  Below we provide some evidence consistent 
with this hypothesis using the 1997 Asia-originated crisis and the 1995 Mexico-
originated crisis experiences.    
 
Measures of environmental regulatory strength and pollution  
 
Table 4 reproduced from Esty and Porter (2001), shows an index of environmental 
regulatory strength for 71 countries of which about 50 are developing countries (the 
index is based on data for the early 2000s).  As can be seen, within the developing 
countries there are very large disparities on the environmental regulatory effectiveness. 
For example, according to the index Uruguay is much closer to Japan than to the 
Philippines or Dominican Republic in this respect.  Among the countries that we analyze 
below we can distinguish Chile, Uruguay and to some extent Brazil among those with the 
highest environmental effectiveness among developing countries; Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand and China, with intermediate effectiveness, and Mexico, Argentina, India, the 
Philippines, Venezuela, Indonesia and Paraguay among those with the least effective 
environmental regulations. Importantly, while most of the highest ranked countries 
correspond to rich ones, the ranking is not completely driven by per capita income 
especially among developing countries. In fact, among the three groups of countries 
mentioned we encounter countries with similar per capita income (say Uruguay, Malaysia 
and Argentina) that are ranked very differently in terms of environmental regulations.   
  
Pollution concentration levels among countries vary quite significantly once we account 
for a per capita income norm. Table 5, also taken from Esty and Porter (2001) provides 
measures of the difference of sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentration between the actual and 
the expected levels given per capita GDP
9.  As can be seen in the Table 5, there are wide 
differences in this index as well. Among the poor countries, for example, it appears that 
while India has concentration below the per capita GDP norm, China has well above it.  
Among the middle income countries Chile has pollution levels below the norm while 
Mexico and Brazil exceed the norm by a wide range.  It is not clear whether or not the 
measured quality of the environmental regulatory framework explains a reasonable 
                                                 
9 Throughout the remainder of this paper we use SO2 as a key indicator of pollution because this is the 
most widely and best measured pollutant.    25
portion of the deviations from the norm. To be sure there are factors other than the 
regulatory framework that may explain such deviations as well. For example, the 
significant differences in the speed of economic growth may be a factor that explains why 
China is above the norm while India is below it despite that in the ranking of 
environmental policies China is above India. Over the nineties China grew almost twice 
as fast as India. It is likely that the countries that grow too fast encounter significant 
problems in catching up with pollution emissions even if their regulatory framework is 
adequate.  
  
  Pollution effects of the crisis: Regulated versus unregulated countries  
In our sample of Latin American countries we have that the countries with most effective 
environmental regulation, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil, appear to all have increased their 
annual rates of SO2 emissions after the 1995 Mexico-originated crisis. Their emissions 
continued to increase all the way until 1999 when the Asia-originated crisis had subsided. 
Figure 15 shows the annual SO2 emission changes for these countries: Prior to the 1995 
Mexican peso crisis Chile had experienced negative rates of emission growth for almost 5 
years despite rapid economic growth. This is an indication that its SO2 regulation 
controls were effective. However, starting in 1995, the first year in which the crisis is felt 
and continuing into 1999, emissions started to increase at a relatively fast pace. In 2000, 
once the effects of the two crises had passed, emissions begun to decrease again.  
Emissions in Uruguay and Brazil, the other countries in the region with somewhat 
effective environmental regulation followed a similar path to that of Chile. Pollution had 
been decreasing for some years prior to the first crisis and then emission growth rates 
became positive over the crises years.   
 
Thus, the cases of Chile, Uruguay and to some extent Brazil fit well with our prediction 
for countries that have effective regulation: During crisis time the regulations are relaxed 
possibly as a deliberate effort to mitigate the employment effects of the crisis. In these 
cases the pollution intensity effect may dominate the potential output scale effects of the 
crisis. The patterns of pollution growth in Paraguay and Argentina, countries that have 
the least effective environmental regulation in the Region, are quite different from Chile 
and Uruguay: In both cases the crises do not seem to have prompted significant increases 
in emission growth.    26
 
The data for emissions in Asian countries show that SO2 concentrations fell significantly 
in most of them, especially in 1998 and 1999, the years when the Asia crisis had its full 
impact (Figures 16 and 17).  Given the magnitude of the crisis in most of these countries 
it is possible that any pollution intensity effect that could have taken place in those that 
had binding environmental regulation was dominated by the acute output contraction 
effect. The case of Korea, however, is illustrative: pollution concentrations continuously 
declined over the nineties and the effect of the crisis was a temporary interruption of the 
declining trend that can be attributed to an equally temporary relaxation of regulations to 
mitigate the economic effects of the crisis. This small (temporary) increase in pollution in 
Korea contrast with the more precipitous and longer lasting reductions of pollution in 
most of the other countries in Asia that generally had weaker environmental regulation. It 
happens that Korea was precisely the highest ranked Asian country in the sample with 
respect to environmental regulatory effectiveness (Table 4).  The smaller pollution effect 
of the crisis in the country with the best environmental regulation is thus consistent with 
the hypothesis discussed earlier.         
 
The previous results appear more clearly when we focus on pollution deviations from the 
country trend rather than the actual levels. Appendix A shows the time trend of SO2 
concentrations and the deviations from the trend in each year for several countries in 
Latin America and Asia.  In general the Figures show an important regularity: Countries 
which in the years prior to the crisis experienced below trend concentrations tend to show 
above trend rates during the crisis years (1995 to 1999 for Latin America and 1997-99 for 
Asia).  That is, countries which presumably had somehow been able to implement 
binding pollution controls prior to the crisis-which may include those where pollution 
rates had become below the trend-  reduce the intensity of such controls which meant that 
during the crisis years pollution rates became higher than the trend level. By contrast, in 
countries that were not implementing significant pollution controls prior to the crisis-
which may include those where pollution was above trend prior to the crisis- the output 
scale effect of the crisis years dominated and pollution rates fell below trend levels. This 
pattern is of course consistent with the central hypothesis of this analysis.  
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The hypothesis presented earlier is also corroborated by some micro case studies for 
water pollutants as well. Afsah (1999), for example, showed that while output of a large 
number of industrial plants surveyed declined by 18% during the 1997-98 crisis period in 
Indonesia, water pollution due to organic waste in industrial effluents as measured by 
BOD concentration increased by 15%.  This paper documents how environmental 
inspections declined during the crisis which in turn reduced abatement efforts by 
industrial plants.  That is, a response to the crisis is to reduce environmental enforcement 
when such regulations are initially applied. This may be due to a deliberate decision by 
government to mitigate the effects of the crisis on production and employment. It may 
also be related to the need for the government to drastically cut environmental 
expenditures as a consequence of the fall of revenues caused by the crisis
10.  In times of 
fiscal crisis governments often cut mostly discretionary expenditures; environmental 
expenditures are usually considered discretionary.        
 
3. Pollutants that are not subject to regulation in developing countries 
 
Pollutants that are not subject to regulations in any developing country include most 
prominently industrial emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other climate change 
gases.  Consistent with the hypothesis presented in the previous section, these pollutants 
are likely to fall with the reduction of economic activity caused by the crisis, although 
under some conditions it is possible that the recession may induce changes in the 
composition of fuels if the crisis changes their relative prices
11.  Also, as we discuss 
below, in countries that still have open-access or semi-open access forests the crisis may 
induce increased deforestation and forest burning that is likely to increase non-industrial 
carbon emissions. Appendix B shows data on CO2 industrial emissions for some Asian 
and Latin American countries. In general the patterns are not nearly as clear as in the case 
of SO2. In part this may reflect the fact that this data is essentially projected on the basis 
of output coefficients rather than corresponding to actual measures as is the case with 
SO2 concentrations.  
                                                 
10 Linking this to our earlier discussion in 1 above about countries that saved and those than did not save 
during the pre-crisis years, it appears that Indonesia was among the latter. This meant that the crisis had a 
profound pro-cyclical impact on fiscal expenditures which spillover into the environmental budgets.  
11 For example, if coal becomes cheaper relative to oil, it is possible that the reduction of economic activity 
be accompanied by an increase in carbon emissions due to the fact that burning coal is generally much 
“dirtier” than burning oil.       28
In general we expect that industrial emissions of climate change gases are likely to fall, or 
their rate of growth to decline, as a consequence of the reduced levels of economic 
activity caused by the crisis. However, in countries that still have forests non-industrial 
CO2 emissions may increase as a consequence of increased forest clearing that the crisis 
may under certain conditions induce.  Thus, the net effect of the crisis on emissions is 
ambiguous. We now turn to issues associated with deforestation.    
 
4. Pressures on Forests and other rural natural resources 
Forest and related ecosystems are affected by two types of forces which are likely to 
behave in opposite directions during crises: (i) pressures from the poor and subsistence 
producers.  Forests are generally the last social protection against poverty. When poverty 
increases there are much greater pressures by subsistence producers on forests which may 
be translated into more deforestation and more forest burning. (ii) Pressures from the 
commercial interests. Forest clearing by large commercial interests linked to agriculture, 
mining or energy is likely to decline as the crisis reduces commodity prices and, 
therefore, diminishes the rate of return to such commercial operations.   
 
Thus, while the net effect of the crisis on deforestation is in general ambiguous we can 
distinguish conditions under which the factors (i) and (ii) above are made weaker or 
stronger.  The larger and poorer is the country’s population the more likely is that the 
subsistence forces of deforestation dominate the for-profit motives. That is, the more 
likely is that the crisis worsens deforestation and increase resource degradation.  Studies 
using remote sensing and survey forest data have found that increasing poverty especially 
in a context of high population density intensifies forest pressures and increases 
deforestation (Deininger and Minten, 2002; Barbier, 2004).    
 
Middle income, low population density countries 
  
In countries where population density and poverty are low the effect (ii) (i.e., the 
commercial interest effect)  may dominate. In middle income countries for example, it 
appears that crises in the past have reduced commercial resource extraction activities as 
well as reduced agricultural expansion. A study by López and Galinato (2005) found that 
deforestation in Brazil- a middle income country with relatively low population density   29
and moderate poverty levels- falls significantly during economic slowdowns. The main 
reason is the contraction of commercial agriculture that is often associated with declining 
commodity prices.   
 
There are two main forces that may reduce the impact of the crisis on the profitability of 
domestic resource extraction activities: (a) Exchange rate devaluation. An important 
effect of the crises is that developing country currencies suffer significant devaluations. 
Since most natural resource commodities are tradable currency devaluation imply an 
incentive to expanding resource extraction especially by commercial interests.  However, 
since in crisis time international commodity prices fall as a consequence of reduced 
demand for commodities from the developed world especially, the net effect on domestic 
commodity prices is ambiguous.  The World Bank (1999) cites a vast literature showing 
that currency devaluation, ceteris paribus, increases deforestation and in general increases 
environmentally damaging resource extraction
12.  However, their analysis of the 1997 
Asia crisis also shows that the net effect of the crisis in some countries has been to 
negatively affect the profitability of logging as well as of other commercial resource 
extracting activities. 
 
 (b) Government subsidies. The fall in the profitability of resource extractive activities 
and hence the amelioration of forest pressure from commercial interests can also be 
mitigated by governments resorting to subsidies and other distortive policies to 
compensate commercial or for-profit natural resource enterprises for the fall in 
commodity prices. Ironically, these undesirable government subsidies may be more 
feasible in cases where governments have been able to save during the boom times as 
they will have more financial resources to implement such policies.  
 
Exchange rate devaluation and governments’ subsidies fomenting resource extraction 
activities may at least partially mitigate the effect of the crisis on deforestation but these 
factors are rarely large enough to fully reverse the decrease in extractive commercial 
activities caused by economic slowdowns (López and Galinato, 2005).  That is, the net 
effect of the crisis is likely to reduce deforestation and forest carbon emissions during 
                                                 
12 Arcand et. al. (2008) econometrically corroborates this finding using a pooled sample of 101 countries 
over a 25 year period. Wunder (2005) also finds that real exchange rate devaluation significantly increase 
deforestation by promoting greater timber exports.     30
crisis times in middle income countries with smaller populations such as Perú, Brazil or 
Chile.  
 
Poor, high population density countries  
 
Among the Asian countries on which we have focused poverty (poverty line: US$1.25 
per day) affects a large portion of the population in India (44% of the rural population), 
China (26% of the rural population), Indonesia (24%), The Philippines (23%) and 
Vietnam (21%)
13.  In addition some of these countries have a very high population 
density, most prominently India (305 habitants per square km), The Philippines (224) and 
Vietnam (219). One would thus predict that in countries that combine high poverty levels 
with dense populations such as these three the effect of the crisis could trigger very 
significant additional pressures on rural natural resources, including forest habitats, 
originated in subsistence households. Unfortunately there are not many aggregate studies 
on deforestation in Asia based on real data as opposed to the commonly used FAO data 
which is mostly based on interpolations.  Below we provide case studies that illustrate the 
hypothesis that forest pressures increase in crisis times in poor, highly populated 
countries.   
    
In general, most empirical studies have concluded that the Asia crisis has led to a drastic 
fall in economic activity in the urban economy which has been in part compensated by 
increased activity in rural areas. In part this is a spontaneous response of those becoming 
unemployed in urban areas which return to rural areas where they can subsist as self 
employed or temporary workers living with their extended families. This also responds to 
deliberate government policies which encourage greater access to natural resources 
including forest activities, mining and fishing during crisis times.  For example, the share 
of the primary sectors in total GDP significantly increased during the crisis in Indonesia 
from 25% to 31%.  
 
Below we focus on case studies using detailed forest and other country data particularly 
emphasizing the case of Indonesia. Indonesia is the most studied case and is the country 
where the impact of the crisis was strongest. According to Aswicahyono, Bird and Hill 
                                                 
13 These data are circa 2005 taken from Chen and Ravallion.   31
(2009) Indonesia suffered a 13% fall in GDP in 1998, by far the largest decrease among 
the four East Asia countries directly affected by the crisis.  The focus on Indonesia is also 
convenient because, as discussed earlier, the magnitude of the current 2008 crisis is such 
that its impact on developing countries is likely to be greater than any previous crisis in 
modern times since the Great Depression.  The size of the impact in the developing world 
is likely to be as large as or perhaps even worse than Indonesia 1998.  For this reason the 
analysis of the Indonesia experience might be much more relevant to evaluate the 
possible future impact of the current crisis in poor developing countries than that of most 
other developing countries in previous crises.  
 
Dauvergne (1999) concludes that the 1997 crisis in Indonesia caused a large expansion of 
agriculture associated with a significant increase in part-time agricultural workers. The 
same is true for mining; in 1997 there was a 25% increase in the total stock of existing 
contracts awarded by the government to mine gold, diamonds, coal, and nickel. The 
government also promoted the commercial fishing industry and illegal fishing by poor 
households increased dramatically. The author also documented that wildlife 
conservation suffered dramatically as a consequence of increased illegal hunting.  
Sunderlin et.al. (2001) found that the crisis caused a large increase of forest clearing by 
commercial interest to expand exports of rubber and other tree crops. In addition the 
authors also found a notable increase in forest clearing by small holders. Pagiola (2001) 
reaches similar though more nuanced conclusions; deforestation did not increase 
homogenously in all regions in Indonesia, and in fact in some areas deforestation would 
have fallen during the crisis. Gaveau et. al. (2009) using detailed survey data showed that 
the 1997-98 crisis caused a significant reversal in law enforcement efforts in the 
Indonesian area studied (Bukit Barisan Selatan). The authors highlight how the 
weakening of the environmental law enforcement in conjunction with the increases in 
real domestic commodity prices caused significant losses of “protected” forests and 
biodiversity.     
 
Thus, it appears that in the case of Indonesia the crisis caused a massive expansion of 
deforestation and resource extraction. Possible causes of this seemingly strong effect is 
that Indonesia, being at the epicenter of the crisis, was affected by a particularly large 
devaluation of its currency (Table 6) which allow commercial resource extractive   32
activities to increase its relative profitability, and the increased pressures on forested 
areas by the large segment of the population that became subsistence producers.  
 
The magnitude of the devaluation was such that it apparently more than off-set the fall of 
international commodity prices leading to increase the domestic commodity prices and 
hence on the profitability of commodity resource extraction. The effects of the crisis on 
resource extraction in other Asian countries, however, were not as severe as in Indonesia 
(The World Bank, 1999).   Pagiola (2001) found that pressure on forest did not 
significantly increase in Thailand or the Philippines. We note, however, that since the 
effect of the crisis on the Philippines was relatively mild compared to the impact on 
Indonesia (Datt and Hoogeveen, 2003) the finding that forest pressures did not increase in 
this country might be simply due to the fact that the quantitative impact on forests was 
harder to identify.     
 
Apart from the world commodity prices-cum-exchange rate devaluation factor there are 
other important factors that affect the impact of the crises on the natural resources. A 
crucial one is the public expenditure response to the crisis.  A study by Vincent et. al. 
(2001) showed that the 1997-98 crisis resulted in drastic cuts in environmental protection 
expenditures in all East Asian countries directed affected by the crisis with the only 
exception of Malaysia.  Also, Kittiprapas (2002) reports deep cuts in both social services 
and environmental protection in Thailand during the crisis. In general the cuts were much 
deeper in regional environmental expenditures than in urban ones. This means that the 
impact of the crisis was even stronger in the mostly rural natural resources than in urban 
pollutants not only because of the reverse migration tendencies discussed earlier but also 






Growing environmental scarcity is not entirely a new phenomenon despite that 
commodity prices only recently appear to have started to reflect it. In part because   33
commodity prices have not historically reflected this, ominous signs of environmental 
scarcity have been systematically and happily ignored by policy makers for several 
decades.   In fact, while the supply of energy, agricultural, metals and other commodities 
has been amazingly responsive to increasing commodity demand, the supply of these 
commodities was increasingly relying in more and more fragile ecosystems. With some 
important exceptions, the key underlying scarcity was not the exhaustion of raw materials 
underground but the increasing damage to ever more scarce ecosystems, over use and 
contamination of water resources, loses of biodiversity and the large air pollution 
generated by the conversion of natural ecosystems to agriculture, logging and other 
products.  In addition, resource extraction is responsible for a significant portion of 
climate changing gas emissions.  Commodity supply appears to have been almost 
infinitely elastic because these ever increasing environmental costs have been allowed to 
be ignored by producers especially but not only in developing countries.  
 
It appears that this growing scarcity is finally beginning to be reckoned with, precisely at 
the time when world economic growth has become more commodity-intensive as a 
consequence of the awakening to the growth process of the sleeping giant countries.  The 
commodity supply curve has become steeper and demand shifts upwards very rapidly 
with growth. The result is obvious: unlike in the times when growth was the privilege of 
an exclusive and small club, nowadays rapid world growth leads to increasing 
commodity prices. And increasing commodity prices are not consistent with price 
stability which forces monetary tightening every time that energy and other commodity 
prices rise in response to growth. This, in turn, in a world where the vast middle class 
consumer has been made worse off and consequently more and more dependent on easy 
credit, suffocates growth.  
 
The analysis of the natural environments in the South has shown that the impact of the 
current crisis is likely to degrade even more dramatically the environmental resources. 
This may exacerbate in an important way the underlying environmental resource scarcity 
in the South. It may compromise even further the ability of the South to respond to a 
growing demand for commodities in the future once economic growth reappears. The 
additional environmental destruction that the crisis may create in the South is likely to 
increase the damages so much that, once normal times return, governments will have   34
increasing difficulties in ignoring demands to implement more serious environmental 
policies which in one way or another will have to consider restrictions on resource 
extraction. That is, the further environmental losses that the current crisis may trigger and 
the likely tightening of environmental policies that the growing scarcity of vital natural 
services may induce could make the commodity supply curve of commodities even 
steeper in the future. This may exacerbate the economic growth-commodity prices 
linkages over the medium term.                 
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Figure 1: Sector composition of GDP in the USA   38
 






Figure 2: Share of Industrial Imports over Total Imports in the USA 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Categories include: Fuel and lubricants, paper and paper base stocks, materials associated with 
nondurables, selected building materials, unfinished and finished metals associated with durables, 
nonmetals associated with durables. 





Figure 3: Industrial and Manufacturing Imports over GDP in the USA 
 
Source Feenstra et. al. (2001), http://www.internationaldata.org/ 
 
Categories Include: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (3), chemicals and 
related products (5), manufactured goods (6), machinery and transport equipment (7), and 














Figure 4: Metal Imports as a proportion of domestic production in the USA 
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Figure 5: Real Commodity Price Trends: Producer Price Index – All Commodities 
 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Components of the Producer Price Index for all commodities include: 
Farm products, Processed foods and feeds, Textile products and apparel, Hides, skins, leather, and related 
products, Fuels and related products and power, Chemicals and allied products, Rubber and plastic 
products, Lumber and wood products, Pulp, paper, and allied products, Metals and metal products, 
Machinery and equipment, Furniture and household durables, Nonmetallic mineral products, 

























Figure 6: Foreign Exchange Reserves (in billions of US Dollars) 
 
India Data Source: Bank of India,  
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Figure 7: Income Distribution in the USA: Income Shares by Groups 
 







   44
 
 
Figure 8: Income Distribution in the UK: Income Share by Groups 
 
Source: World Income Inequality Database (WIID), United Nations University – World 
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Figure 9: Real Household income by Income Groups in the USA 
 

























Figure 10: China and India Energy Consumption and Share in World Consumption  
 
Left Axis: Energy Consumption in Quadrillion Btu 
Right Axis: % of Total World Consumption 
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Figure 11: China and India Petroleum Consumption and Share in World Consumption 
 
Right Axis: unit - % over World Consumption 
Left Axis: unit – Thousands Barrels per day 
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Figure 13: Commodity Prices, Inflation, and Monetary Policy in the USA 
 
Left Axis: Oil Price per Barrel, PPI – Commodities 
Right Axis: Core Inflation, Effective Federal Funds Rate 
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Figure 14: China and India Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
 
Left Axis: Million Metric Tons of CO2 
Right Axis: % of Total World CO2 Emissions 
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Figure 15: SO2 Emissions, Latin America 
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Figure 16: SO2 Emissions, China and India 
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Figure 17: SO2 Emissions, East Asia 
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Table 1: Real GDP Growth Rate 
 
China and India Advanced 
Economies 





1961-2007 6.8  3.4 2.7 3.4 
1961-1990 5.6  4.2 2.7 3.9 
1991-2009 8.4  2.5 3.3 2.9 
    
1961-1969 3.9  5.4 5.3 5.3 
1970-1979 4.4  4.0 3.1 3.8 
1980-1989 8.2  3.3 2.5 3.2 
1990-1999 8.9  2.5 2.6 2.8 
2000-2007 9.2  2.3 4.4 3.1 
Source: WDI, World Bank 
Advanced Country List: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, USA 
 
World Bank Definitions of Low, Medium, and High Income countries: GNI per capita range (2007) 
Low: $935 or less 
Middle: More than $905 but less than $11,116 







Table 2: Contribution to Change in World Real GDP (in millions) 








1961-1969 5,154  366,333 120,100 491,587 
1970-1979 12,198  514,740 47,150 574,088 
1980-1989 36,740  472,160 94,735 603,635 
1990-1999 86,310  519,200 116,040 721,550 
2000-2007 201,375  618,875 274,525 1,094,775 
Source: WDI, World Bank 
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Table 3: Demand for Metals 
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Table 4: Environmental Regulatory Regime Index by Country, Absolute Ranking 
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Table 5: Difference of SO2 concentration between the actual and the expected levels, 
given per capita GDP 
 
 
Source: Esty and Porter (2001) 
 
 
Table 6: Asian Financial Crisis Currency Depreciation 
 
Asian Crisis - Forex Markets vs. US$ 
Country Depreciation  Period 
Indonesia  -84%  July-97 to July-98 
Thailand  -53%  July-97 to July-98 
Korea  -51%  July-97 to July-98 
Malaysia  -47%  July-97 to July-98 
Philippines  -40%  July-97 to July-98 
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